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Abstract 
Since the early 1990s the European Union has struggled to increase integration in the 
sovereignty sensitive areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy. The aim of this 
paper is to enhance our understanding of what patterns of cooperation have been established 
between the member states, and why. I do so by analysing the case of short-stay visa policy. 
Visas are a corner stone of EU’s border control, regulating access to the Union’s area of 
freedom, security and justice. It is moreover an instrument used in foreign and diplomatic 
relations. As a field where the member states’ cooperation is particularly intense it is an 
‘extreme case’ well-suited for drawing out empirical patterns and developing theoretical 
concepts. The paper is based on a network analytical approach and a new dataset of all the 
EU/Schengen member states’ mutual consular visa assistance agreements. This I use to 
document the extent and pattern of cooperation from 2005 to 2010. I show that the member 
states rely intensively on each other’s consular services. They mainly share sovereignty in 
four distinct regional clusters – a Nordic, Benelux, Southern European and an emerging 
Central Eastern. France and Germany are at the centre of the network. To explain this 
structure of cooperation I discuss the relative merits of realist, liberal intergovernmentalist 
and constructivist approaches. I show how they each identify important dynamics but 
emphasise the relative merits of a constructivist perspective. I put forward a new concept of 
‘regional imagined communities’ which explains cooperation by the existence of shared 
identities owing to regional commonalities in language and state-building histories. I argue 
that the concept improves our understanding of European integration in visa policy, and 
suggest it might hold wider potential for explaining dynamics of collaboration in other 
sovereignty sensitive policy areas. 
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European visa cooperation: interest 
politics and regional imagined 
communities 
 
Introduction 
From the beginning of the 1990s and onwards the European Union has established 
still closer cooperation in the controversial areas of justice and home affairs and 
foreign policy (Lavenex & W. Wallace 2005; Howorth 2001).  
Yet because of the sovereignty-sensitive character of the policy fields integration has 
in both cases stopped short of full supranational and hierarchical governance 
(Lavenex 2009: 256f). Cooperation has instead primarily been marked by “intensive 
transgovernmentalism” (Lavenex 2010: 469; W. Wallace & Giegerich 2010: 431; H. 
Wallace 2010: 93).1 This term captures the existence of substantial and dense 
collaboration strongly dominated by the member states. The supranational 
institutions, such as the European Commission, Parliament and the Court of Justice, 
only play a minor role (H. Wallace 2010: 92f).2 Pin-pointing the overall importance of 
state governments existing research has, however, not investigated in detail the 
constraints and structures in their mutual interaction.3 In this paper I aim to 
                                                        
1 Wallace (2010) classifies intensive transgovernmentalism as one policy-making mode alongside 
four other used in the EU: the classical community method, the EU regulatory mode, the EU 
distributional mode and policy coordination. Tömmel (2009) operates with four types of 
European governance: hierarchical, negotiation, competition and cooperation. In her framework 
intensive transgovernmentalism could be seen as a hybrid of negotiation and cooperation. 
2 Transgovernmentalism can also be defined as a situation where actors from diverse ministries 
and levels of government cooperate directly with their counterparts in other European states 
without explicit national coordination and control from for example foreign ministries (Mérand, 
Hofmann & Irondelle 2010; see also Bigo 2000; Lavenex 2009: 258). 
3 An exception to this trend has been the general observation that cooperation is limited by the 
need for a converging interest of all members and that as a result political agreements reached 
tends to reflect the lowest common denominator (Lavenex 2009: 266). 
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contribute to the existing literature by investigating what patterns of cooperation has 
been established between the member states in a particular sovereignty sensitive 
policy area, and why.  
The case I study is European consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. Visas 
grant or deny individuals legal access to state territories (Guild 2009: 118f). 
Establishing and enforcing visa restrictions are matters of diplomacy and foreign 
relations, as well as central instruments in relation to internal security and the control 
of illegal migration (Martenczuk 2009). It is thus a case on both interior and foreign 
policy cooperation. Visas are, additionally, an example of a sovereignty-sensitive 
policy area where the member states have established especially strong cooperation 
(Lavenex & Ucarer 2002: 6).4 It is thereby an ‘extreme case’ (Flyvbjerg 1991: 150) and 
as such able to bring out empirical patterns otherwise not easily identifiable. In that 
way it provides a good basis for theoretical development (George & Bennett 2005: 
75).  
Based on a new, comprehensive and original dataset of consular visa cooperation 
agreements and a network analytical method I advance two empirical arguments 
and one theoretical: 
Firstly, the EU-states cooperate intensively abroad in visa matters. Outside Europe, 
the average Schengen member has independent visa-issuing consular representation 
in about 50 countries, relies on cooperative agreements in 50 and is not represented 
in 70 states.  
Secondly, the structure of the cooperation largely follows regional clusters within 
Europe. The Nordic countries, Benelux, Southern Europe and to some extent also the 
new Central and Eastern member states all cooperate internally. France and 
Germany ties the clusters together as the centre of the network. Thus, the Schengen 
states mainly cooperate in the visa entry control process within tight regional circles.  
                                                        
4 Lavenex (2010: 462) characterizes asylum and visa policy as the areas of justice and home 
affairs where the member states has gone the furthest in transferring “comprehensive 
competences” to the EU. These two areas “are gradually moving towards more supranational 
structures” although there is still not a “single official ‘common policy’” (Lavenex 2009: 255). 
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Thirdly, while both realism and liberal intergovernmentalism are able to explain 
important parts of the empirical pattern, constructivism on the whole goes furthest in 
accounting for the network structure (Waltz 1979; Moravcsik 1993; Jepperson, Wendt 
& Katzenstein 1996). In particular, I put forward a concept of ‘regional imagined 
communities’ (cf. Anderson 1991) as a central factor in explaining the cooperation. 
This notion, I suggest, could have a wider analytical potential as a tool for 
understanding integration in other sovereignty-sensitive areas. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. I start out by presenting the case 
and existing research on visa cooperation abroad. Then the data and methods used 
are presented. I subsequently conduct the empirical analysis and discuss three 
theoretical explanations of the patterns of cooperation identified. Finally, I conclude 
and set out the wider implications of the findings. 
 
EU visa policy cooperation 
Today, with the dismantling of almost all internal borders in Europe considerable 
political and administrative resources are invested in attempts to strengthen and 
harmonise the control of the EU’s external border (Thielemann & Sasse 2005). Short-
stay visas are a centre-piece of these efforts (Bigo & Guild 2005). For the nationals of 
the approximately 130 countries currently on EU’s common visa list the first and 
main check of their eligibility to enter the EU occurs at consulates abroad during the 
application procedure (Guild 2003). Visas thus aim to ensure that travellers are pre-
screened before they arrive at the territorial border.  
Visa requirements also play a role in diplomatic relations (Martenczuk 2009; Stringer 
2004). Travel restrictions can be imposed on some third countries and not others as 
part of a differentiation between allies and adversaries. They are used as a ‘carrot’ 
and ‘stick’ and can be imposed or lifted as a concession to another partner or to 
signal a bi-lateral worsening or improvement of relations. As part of the EU 
European visa cooperation 
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enlargement process, for example, visa restrictions have been gradually liberalized 
for most of the countries in the Balkans (Trauner 2009: 75-77).  
The EU has attempted to encourage different forms of administrative cooperation in 
the visa-issuing process to ensure a uniform application of the shared visa 
legislation. The European Commission has promoted the idea of joint application 
processing centres (see for example Com 2007). The common rules also encourage 
local consular officials to meet and exchange data. Finally, a member state can make 
a bilateral agreement transferring fully or partly the visa-issuing process in a specific 
country or city to another Schengen member represented at the location (OJEU 2009). 
These options for cooperation abroad have been partially analysed both within the 
justice and home affairs and the foreign policy literature.  
The justice and home affairs literature has in general shown considerable interest in 
visas and consular cooperation abroad (cf. Bigo & Guild 2005; Guild 2003; Pijpers & 
van der Velde 2007). It has, however, mainly focused on the overall legal framework 
and policy documents. Systematic empirical studies of the practice of consular visa 
cooperation have not been carried out within this literature.  
Foreign policy analysts have largely focused on the creation of institutional 
structures of cooperation in Brussels, or on changes in the central offices of national 
foreign ministries as a result of EU integration (Carlsnaes, Sjursen & White 2004). A 
few authors have also devoted some attention to European diplomatic and consular 
networks abroad.  
Rijks and Whitman (2007: 39-41) analyse overall aspects of European diplomatic 
cooperation. They note that this concept is somewhat vague and propose a 
distinction between sharing “facilities” (buildings, support staff) and “capabilities” 
(diplomatic tasks, consular services). They state that the sharing of facilities and 
capabilities have not yet been much of a success. The attempts to construct joint visa 
application centres have not gained particular momentum.  
Mogens Hobolth 
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Fernandez (2006) uses an Europeanization framework to analyse local consular 
cooperation and investigate how and to what extent the member states regularly 
meet and exchange information. Based primarily on an analysis of EU evaluation 
reports and policy documents she concludes that results have been “mixed” 
(Fernández 2006: 16f). On the one hand there has been an incorporation of EU rules 
and norms in local practices. But, on the other hand, resistance and lack of 
convergence remains due to the sensitivity of the area. 
In sum, the member states have over the years harmonized overall approaches in the 
area of visas, a policy central to both foreign relations and internal security and 
migration control. Both the justice and home affairs and the foreign policy literature 
have taken an interest in the consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. The few 
analyses conducted so far indicates, however, that at this administrative level 
cooperation remains more limited. In the next section I set out the data and methods 
I utilize to contribute to our existing knowledge of European consular cooperation 
abroad in visa matters. 
 
Data and methods 
I measure the structure and extent of cooperation abroad using a new dataset 
covering the bilateral visa representation agreements entered into by the member 
states. I do not investigate meetings and exchange of data between officials in third 
countries (‘local consular cooperation’) or the establishment of joint embassy 
compounds (‘shared visa application centres’).  
The rules governing the bilateral agreements are set out in the common visa code 
(OJEU 2009).5 The specific form of cooperation can vary within a given bilateral 
agreement. There can, for example, be rules on costs-distribution and consultation 
                                                        
5 The 2009 visa code replaced, with minor changes, the previous regulations about bilateral 
agreements specified in the so-called Common Consular Instructions (CCI). This document laid 
out the rules and norms for the entire visa issuing process (OJEU 2002). The main difference 
between the old and the new regulations were the introduction of somewhat more detailed and 
explicit requirements about how the agreements should be legally formulated. 
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for certain categories of applicants. I only measure the overall existence of 
agreements. This entails that the indicator might capture somewhat different forms 
of bilateral cooperation. For my purposes, however, what matters is less the precise 
nature of the agreement but whether or not some form of collaboration takes place.  
The data source for the analysis of the representation agreements is the overviews 
produced by the Council’s General Secretariat until April 2010 (“Annex 18” tables).6 
These were based on notifications by the member states of the cities abroad in which 
they had independent representation or relied on a visa-issuing agreement.  
I have coded six versions of the consolidated overviews at yearly intervals starting in 
October 2004 and ending in April 2010 (Council 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010b). 
The amount of cooperation changes throughout a given year. I used the consolidated 
version closest to January as an indicator of the approximate setup for the year in 
question. For example, the consolidated version from November 2005 is used as the 
best possible indicator of the cooperative setup throughout the whole of 2006. 
For the different years the dataset covers all members of the Schengen cooperation, 
and all third countries abroad. One of the major events in the period was the 
enlargement of the Schengen area from 15 member states to 24 in late 2007. The 
dataset contains three measurements before the enlargement of Schengen and three 
afterwards. In 2008 Switzerland also joined bringing the total membership up to 25.7 
The core of the dataset is two tables. The first contains a list of all the member states’ 
own visa-issuing representations abroad per country, city and year. The raw data 
contains footnotes about the extent of consular services – if for example visas are 
solely issued to diplomatic personnel. I have only used a simple coding of whether or 
not a country has a visa facility at the location. For all six years this yields 9.472 
observations. The second table contains a list of each cooperative agreement between 
                                                        
6 According to article 53(a) of the new visa code the member state must now inform the 
Commission of the existence of bilateral agreements, which is then obliged to publish the 
overview of agreements (OJEU 2009, cf. Council 2010a). 
7 I use the following member state acronyms: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, DK: 
Denmark, EL: Greece, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, IS: Iceland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, NL: 
Netherlands, NO: Norway, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden, HU: Hungary, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, SI: 
Slovenia, EE: Estonia, LT: Lithuania, PL: Poland, CZ: Czech Republic, SK: Slovakia, SZ: Switzerland. 
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two member states per city, country and year. The total count of agreements is 6.852. 
If a cooperation agreement ended during a year, I included it if it lasted for more 
than half of the year in question.  
The main method I utilize to investigate the data is network analysis (Wasserman & 
Faust 1994; Scott 2000). This technique is especially well-suited for identifying and 
clarifying the structure of relationship between actors by modelling their mutual 
contact. The analytical unit in network analysis is pairs of actors – for example two 
countries and the amount of contact between them. For the purpose of the network 
analysis I thus recoded the data into bilateral pairs of member states. For each year I 
measured the total number of agreements between them. This measure is directional 
(Wasserman & Faust 1994: 273). There are not necessarily a symmetric number of 
agreements between two actors. In 2010, for example, Sweden relied on Norwegian 
consular services in 17 cities abroad; Norway was represented by Sweden in 14 
locations.  
I conduct the empirical analysis over time highlighting changes and continuities in 
the cooperation. Although the analysed period is relatively short – six years – an 
analysis over time is mandated because of the considerable shift in membership in 
the middle of the period with the enlargement of the Schengen area. 
The two main network analytical tools are sociometrices and graphs (Scott 2000: 8-
16). Sociometrices are tables detailing the relationships between the actors. Network 
graphs give an overview of the content of the tables by displaying the actors (nodes) 
and their interaction (relations) in such a way that the actors with the highest amount 
of mutual contact are clustered together. I mainly use network graphs in the analysis. 
I constructed the graphs using the visualization software ORA developed by the 
Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems at the 
Carnegie Mellon University (CASOS 2010). The positioning of the different actors on 
the graphs is in general stable, but the location of a node can vary slightly if the data 
is open for varying mathematical solutions. Sociometrices setting out the detailed 
content of the dataset are included in the annex. 
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A key consideration in the construction of the graphs is to what extent all relations 
between actors should be modelled or only significant or strong ties. This is an 
important issue because a threshold makes it possible to better identify patterns, and 
is thus also highly important for the conclusions drawn. I have consistently used the 
mean number of agreements between any two member states as the cut-off point for 
all years. This ensures the reliability of the analysis. The threshold for inclusion is 
thereby in practice between seven to nine agreements. The Schengen-members on 
average has about 50 mutual cooperative agreements. A bilateral relation covering 
less than seven to nine agreements would thus seem minor. The threshold therefore 
also appears valid as it ensures that only significant relations are included. 
In the next sections I present the results of the analysis. 
 
The extent of the European consular cooperation in visa policy 
Table 1 presents an overview of the extent of the European consular cooperation in 
the area of visa policy at the beginning of 2010: 
Mogens Hobolth 
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Member state Independent Cooperative Both None
Europe / Schengen average 51 49 2 67
Austria 50 80 6 34
Belgium 64 72 3 31
Czech Republic 66 0 0 104
Denmark 39 65 4 62
Estonia 10 56 3 101
Finland 46 52 1 71
France 125 12 2 31
Germany 116 24 1 29
Greece 57 74 5 34
Hungary 46 27 5 92
Iceland 0 90 1 79
Italy 102 35 0 33
Latvia 14 34 2 120
Lithuania 21 16 0 133
Luxembourg 4 129 3 34
Malta 11 70 3 86
Netherlands 80 54 3 33
Norway 44 58 6 62
Poland 63 1 0 106
Portugal 50 85 1 34
Slovakia 37 0 0 133
Slovenia 16 88 5 61
Spain 96 45 0 29
Sweden 46 62 3 59
Switzerland 77 0 0 93
Table 1. European consular representation in third countries in visa matters
SOURCE: 2010 data from annex 18 of the Common Consular Instructions (Council 2010b). The dataset 
covers 170 third countries outside the Schengen area.  
Table 1 show that the Schengen states in general strongly rely on cooperative 
arrangements for visa-issuing. On average, the European states have independent 
representation in 51 third countries, relies on their partners in 49, both forms in 2 and 
do not have a consular presence at all in 67 states. Cooperative representation is thus 
almost as common as having independent visa issuing facilities in a third country. 
There are, however, considerable differences between the member states. France, 
Germany and Italy are independently represented in over 100 countries. Iceland and 
Luxembourg have almost no visa-representations. The vast majority of the EU-states 
have independent representation in visa matters in 40 to 60 third countries.  
In the next section I investigate in closer detail the precise structure and development 
of the cooperation in the analysed period. 
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The structure of the consular cooperation 
This section discusses the results of the network analysis focusing on the main tenets 
of the consular network before and after the enlargement of the Schengen area in 
December 2007. Figure one to three below shows the structure of the cooperation in 
the period from late 2004 until the Schengen enlargement: 
 
 Figure 1: Consular cooperation 2005 
Notes: Data from 2004.10.11. Relations with a weight below 8.7 (the mean number cities abroad 
covered by an agreement between two member states) excluded. These are viewed as 
insignificant. The arrows show the direction of the relationship. Finland is not included because 
none of its relations has a weight above the cut-off point. Size of the Schengen area: 15 member 
states. 
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Figure 2: Consular cooperation 2006 
Notes: Data from 07.11.2005. Links with a weight below 8.9 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Size of the Schengen area: 15 member states. 
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Figure 3: Consular cooperation 2007 
Notes: Data from 16.10.2006. Links with a weight below 8.7 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Size of the Schengen area: 15 member states. 
 
Figure 1, for 2005, shows France at the centre of the network. All the other member 
states rely on France to represent them in a significant number of locations abroad 
(above 8).  Germany is also highly central but not to the same extent. This is 
primarily because Italy and the Nordic countries – expect for Norway – solely 
interacts with France. Thus, only 11 countries rely on Germany’s consulates for 
representation abroad. 
Italy is somewhat isolated in the network as it only cooperates with France, and the 
other member states do not in general rely on its otherwise extensive consular 
services. Finland is excluded altogether from the picture because it only has a 
marginal number of ties with the other member states.  
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The remaining member states cluster in three sub-groups. There is, firstly, a Nordic 
group consisting of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland relies on all the 
other Scandinavian countries. Denmark cooperates with Norway and Sweden. 
Norway and Sweden, finally, do not cooperate with each other and thus occupy 
opposite ends of the Nordic sub-group. The Scandinavian countries are primarily 
connected to the rest of the network through France. The second grouping is the 
Benelux countries. The Netherlands is the primary actor in this group with 
Luxembourg and Belgium relying on its representations. The Southern European 
cluster is slightly more complex. At the centre of it is Spain, which Greece and 
Portugal rely on. Austria also belongs to this group because of its ties with Spain. 
Italy, as noted, is not a part of the Southern group. 
In 2006, as shown in figure 2, Finland entered the network connected to Germany 
and Netherlands. It did not join the Nordic group perhaps testifying to its peculiar 
relation to the other Scandinavian countries. Italy established ties with Germany.  
Figure 3 illustrates that in 2007 Finland began to cooperate with Sweden moving it 
towards the Nordic group. It also, however, had relations with the Netherlands. This 
pulled the Netherlands somewhat away from the other Benelux countries. The 
centrality of Germany, finally, increased as Sweden established a connection with it. 
In sum, in the years prior to the enlargement of Schengen the consular cooperation 
between the member states occurred in a stable and recurrent structure. France was 
at the centre of the network. Germany similarly occupied a key role, but was less 
central because it did not cooperate with most of the Nordic countries. Italy had a 
somewhat secluded role only linked with France and partially Germany. The Nordic 
countries – but Finland – cooperated in a distinct sub-group as did the Benelux 
countries. The Southern European countries, and Austria, finally clustered together. 
The pattern of cooperation thus largely followed regional geographical groupings in 
Europe.  
Figure four to six shows the structure of the consular network after the Schengen 
enlargement. 
European visa cooperation 
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Figure 4: Consular cooperation 2008 
 
Notes: Data from 17.12.2007. Links with a weight below 8.8 excluded as insignificant (see explanatory 
comments to figure 1). Hungary and Latvia are not shown because none of their relations had a weight 
above the cut-off point. Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland were not part of 
any cooperative agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 24 member states. 
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Figure 5: Consular cooperation 2009 
 
Notes: Data from 01.12.2008. Links with a weight below 8.4 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Poland is not shown because none of its relations had a 
weight above the cut-off point. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were not part of any cooperative 
agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 24 member states. 
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Figure 6: Consular cooperation 2010 
 
Notes: Data from 04.30.2010. Links with a weight below 7.5 excluded as insignificant (see 
explanatory comments to figure 1). Poland and Switzerland are not shown because none of their 
relations had a weight above the cut-off point. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were not part of 
any cooperative agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 25 states. 
 
The post-enlargement figures in general show a process of change from 2008 to 2010, 
and the added complexity of the network resulting from the larger membership. 
Initially, as shown in figure 4, the Schengen enlargement only entailed changes in the 
Southern cluster of the network. Malta established ties with Italy and Austria; 
Slovenia with Austria, Portugal, Italy and Germany. Compared with the Nordic and 
the Benelux groups the Southern cluster thus became more diverse and less clearly 
structured. The remaining new members did not enter into agreements. 
A year later, in 2009, the Southern European network gained a clearer structure. In 
general, it was connected to the rest of Europe through Germany and France. 
Slovenia, however, also had direct ties with the Netherlands. Additionally, the Baltic 
States and Hungary entered the network. But in contrast with the Nordic and the 
Benelux states the Baltic States did not establish a sub-group. Estonia established ties 
Mogens Hobolth 
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with Finland and Germany, Lithuania with Hungary, and Latvia with Hungary and 
Germany. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were still not a part. The new 
members of the network mainly established ties with Germany moving the centre 
away from France.  
The data for 2010, finally, shows several changes. The main trend was the 
establishment of Hungary as the centre of a new Central-Eastern cluster covering 
Slovenia, Lithuania and Latvia but not Estonia. Estonia is only indirectly connected 
to the cluster through a new link with Slovenia, but it also initiated a new relation 
with Spain. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not participate in the 
network at all. The Netherlands appeared to be gradually becoming a minor 
Northern centre in its own right. Spain, finally, became more clearly positioned as 
the main actor in the Southern cluster. 
In sum, the network of consular cooperation in visa matters shows considerable 
continuity before and after the Eastern enlargement of Schengen but also new 
tendencies. The Nordic and the Benelux clusters remain intact, and the Southern 
seems to have been strengthened by the addition of Malta, Slovenia and Italy. Two 
main other post-Enlargement changes are the emergent creation of a Central-Eastern 
cluster, and a shift in the centre of the network towards Germany. In the next section 
I discuss different possible explanations of this pattern of cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European visa cooperation 
 
 
 
18 
Explaining the extent and pattern of cooperation 
There is a wide range of theories of European integration (Rosamond 2000). Three of 
the main contemporary approaches are realism (Waltz 1979; Hoffmann 1966; 
Howorth 2001; Hill 1998), liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 
& Nicolaïdes 1999) and constructivism (Neumann 2002; Wæver 1998; Bretherton & 
Vogler 2006). In the following sections I use these three theories to develop a set of 
explanations of the visa cooperation abroad, and discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of the accounts.  
 
A realist explanation 
Realism is a key theory of international relations (Legro & Moravcsik 1999: 5), and is 
often used in studies of especially European foreign policy (Howorth 2001; Hill 
1998). It is a rich and varied approach.8 My analytical starting-point is neo-realism 
and its picture of world politics as an international anarchy populated by sovereign 
states (Waltz 1979: 7; Keohane 1986: 7). The interest of the state is in this account 
defined as survival (Waltz 1979). Concerned first and foremost with securing their 
own continued existence the states will attempt to balance each other so that no actor 
becomes powerful enough to conquer the others. What determines policy is solely 
the overall distribution of material capabilities in the system of states – not 
ideologies, historical ties or domestic politics. International relations are hence highly 
competitive and mistrustful. Consequently, neo-realism is sceptical about the 
possibility of cooperation in global politics. This is especially the case for the larger 
and more powerful states, which are the analytical focus of the theory (Keohane 
1986).  
Applied to EU visa policy, this line of explanation directs our attention towards the 
structure and extent of cooperation between the major member states. These are 
France and Germany and, albeit to a lesser extent, Italy, Spain and Poland. The first 
                                                        
8 For a critical discussion of different lines of argument within realism see Legro and Moravcsik (1999). 
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two form the centre of the network with a range of smaller countries relying on their 
consular representations. This is in line with realist expectations. It is more difficult 
to explain why Germany makes use of some French consulates, but this might still be 
seen as a relatively insignificant level of cooperation. Poland does not cooperate at 
all, again supporting the realist account. Spain is a local centre of the Southern cluster 
though it also relies on Italian, French and German facilities. The latter is difficult to 
explain but could reflect that Spain is a less powerful state. The same would hold for 
Italy and its increased dependence on France and Germany. Finally, it might be an 
anomaly that the smaller EU-states cooperate intensively with each other, but then 
again they are not overall significant in international relations.  
Neorealism thus offers a fairly convincing explanation of the position of the major 
states. It is not, however, concerned with minor states and therefore does not provide 
an account of their cooperation. Yet most EU countries are small and they are 
responsible for a substantial amount of the visas issued. Hence to understand 
European visa cooperation these member states should also be accounted for.  
If we shift the focus to classical realism (Rose 1998; Rynning 2011) smaller states 
reappear as relevant objects of analysis. Moreover, the geopolitics of territory, 
population flows and frontiers become important (Wæver 1992a: 172; Ashley 1987; 
Rudolph 2003). States have a fixed location and their interests are therefore to a large 
extent driven by which countries they find themselves bordering. Thus, organised 
crime or social upheaval in a neighbour country is a security concern for a state as it 
could threaten the stability of the border area. This territorial dimension was largely 
absent in the neorealist model with its structuralist focus on global power relations 
(Buzan & Wæver 2003: 11).9 
The classical, geopolitical realist explanation directs our attention to the EU states 
which share territorial borders with third countries. This shifts the focus to the 
Southern and Eastern clusters. The former have strong interests in trade and 
                                                        
9
 Mouritzen (1997: 80) argues that geographical location is entirely absent from the neo-realist model 
because it was originally based on an analogy to the micro-economic concept of a market, an idea which 
does not involve territory. 
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migration control towards Northern Africa. The latter shares similar concerns in 
relation to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Yet, common interests do not 
equal a preference for cooperation. On the contrary, where concerns run high a 
realist account predicts that states would opt to retain independent policy-making 
capabilities. This is precisely what a closer look at the data suggests. Though 
Southern Europe cooperates intensively they do not collaborate when it comes to 
their immediate North African and Middle-Eastern neighbours. Here they have 
independent consular representation in visa matters. The same is the case for the 
Eastern cluster with regards to their bordering states. Where national interests are at 
stake we thus, as expected, find that the states have chosen to retain their capacity to 
conduct independent migration control. Classical geopolitical realism can therefore 
explain the visa strategy of small and larger EU members located in the territorial 
periphery of the union towards their neighbours. Other patterns of cooperation and 
non-cooperation fall outside the scope of this account.  
This somewhat narrow focus is itself a limitation of the explanation. What is more 
troubling is that movement and trade are not as tied to geographical proximity as 
they might have been once. Today, transport is easy facilitating flows of money and 
persons across large distances (Neumann & Gstöhl 2006: 13). The cooperation 
between EU member-states in relation to remote third countries thus needs to be 
accounted for. A realist reply to this criticism could be that the substantial amount of 
collaboration within the regional clusters concerns third countries of little relevance 
to state interests. But this is not the case. Within the Southern and Eastern groups 
states rely on each other’s consulates in immigration sending countries like 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran and key trade partners such as China and India. 
This questions the classical realist account. 
Realism, in sum, is able to explain some of the central dynamics in the structure and 
extent of cooperation. Specifically, it provides an account of the position of the main 
players. Yet the key pattern in the data – regional clusters – is not adequately 
accounted for.  
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Liberal intergovernmentalism 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a central approach in European studies mainly 
developed by Moravcsik (1993, 2003). The theory models EU-politics as a two-level 
game (cf. Putnam 1988). In a first round of domestic politics – primarily involving 
economic interest groups – the preference of a member state towards a given issue is 
formed. In a second stage at the EU-level the state then negotiates rationally with the 
other EU-members to achieve an outcome as close as possible to this interest. The 
international bargaining process occurs in a dense net of institutional rules and 
norms where the member states can make credible commitments and link diverse 
issues to enable more players to be accommodated (cf. Keohane 1984).  
A member state thus settles on its visa policy preference in the national stage of the 
game. Should the overall approach be liberal or restrictive? Key actors are economic 
interest groups – major companies, trade organizations and the tourism industry. 
Because of their interest in easy travel for tourists and business partners we would 
expect them to lobby for a liberal policy: extensive consular representation abroad 
and generous visa issuing practices. National politicians seeking re-election can also 
play a role at this level, Moravcsik emphasises (1993: 483f). When migration is a 
highly salient issue governments could have an interest in a restrictive policy. Thus 
for example in countries with strong anti-immigration parties protecting the borders 
could be central to appeasing popular concerns and winning votes.  
In the subsequent European stage of the game the government then identifies and 
aligns with other member states with a similar policy preference. Countries with a 
liberal approach to migration control would be expected to cooperate with other 
liberal players. The restrictive states should similarly collaborate with each other.  
The Southern cluster in the network lends some support to this explanation. In 
especially Greece, Malta, Spain and Portugal tourism constitute a considerable part 
of the domestic economies (World Bank 2010). Tourism is also significant, though to 
a lesser extent, in Austria. Although intra-European visits are likely to be a major 
part of this, especially the larger Southern countries attract guests from all over the 
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world. It would therefore seem likely that the tourism industry here is able to lobby 
the government and work for a liberal visa policy. These member states would 
thereby end up pursuing a similar liberal interest. This in turn can explain why they 
cooperate with each other at the European level. 
Yet tourism is not a major industry in the other member states and this factor 
therefore cannot account for the other clusters. What about bilateral trading 
interests? Extra-European trade constitute a considerable (above 15%, 2009 figures) 
share of the GDP of Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia (Eurostat 2010, 2011). Thus, in these countries 
companies and trade organisations would seem likely to have a particularly strong 
interest in an open access policy. We should therefore expect them to push their 
governments in this direction. A common domestic interest in liberal visa policy 
could explain the significant cooperation between these states. It cannot, however, 
account for why there are two distinct clusters – Benelux and the Eastern group – 
and not just one large cluster. But the Central and Eastern members have only 
recently joined the common visa policy. If this trade-based liberal account is correct 
we should thus expect cross-cluster relations to develop in the coming years. There 
remains the Nordic group. These countries do not have a similarly high level of 
external trade. Hence it makes sense that they do not form a part of the others 
clusters. But in the absence of a strong external trade interest it is difficult to explain 
why they should cooperate intensively with each other. 
To what extent can national partisan politics supplement this explanation and 
account for especially Nordic alignment? Radical right-wing parties are particularly 
strong electorally in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and 
France (Rydgren 2008: 737f; Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers 2002: 357). From the 
perspective of domestic electoral politics it is thus understandable that Denmark and 
Norway would cooperate. Their reliance on restrictive France is to be expected as 
well. The recent collaboration between Norway and the Netherlands equally makes 
sense. It is, however, difficult to see why Norway and Denmark would align with 
liberal Sweden. Instead, we should expect to see cooperation with Austria, while 
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Sweden should rely on pro-migration Spain. National partisanship thus can provide 
some explanation of Nordic cooperation, but face important counter evidence. 
Summing up, liberal intergovernmentalism offers a convincing account of the 
Southern cluster and to some extent also the Eastern and Benelux groups. It is less 
able to explain Nordic cooperation. Nor does it account for the role of Germany and 
France as network centres. 
 
A constructivist approach 
Constructivism is the major alternative to realist and liberal approaches within 
international relations and European foreign affairs studies (cf. Smith 2001). The 
general starting-point is the meta-theoretical claim that the world does not have 
meaning independently of the language we use to describe it (Campbell 1998: 4). 
From this follows that we should be analytically interested in and study the ways in 
which different discourses and practices give significance to and allows us to 
interpret actions and events (Larsen 1999: 453; cf. Neumann 2002). Instead of merely 
assuming that state interests are objectively given we should focus on how 
construction of identities make interests meaningful and inform how they are 
defined (Weldes 1996; Ringmar 1996).  
The analytical ambition of constructivist approaches varies. Hansen (2006; for a 
discussion see Wendt 1998) argues for the “impossibility of causality” and pleads for 
a sole focus on the “constitutive” effects of discourses and practices. We can thus 
investigate how shared constructions make events and actions meaningful, but we 
cannot attribute a causal role to ideas (cf. Neumann 1994). Wæver (1998) pleads for a 
focus on “negative predictions” emphasising that discourse analysis should not be 
used in attempts to explain what will happen but only to map out the field of actions 
that would not be meaningful and hence are unlikely to occur. Jepperson, 
Katzenstein and Wendt (1996; see also Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) argue that 
“ideational” factors can and should be included in causal analysis alongside 
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“material”. Thus, for any given political situation we can investigate the independent 
and relative causal importance of shared beliefs in bringing about the outcome. In 
this paper I follow this latter causal, explanatory approach. I view discourses and 
practices as constitutive of shared identities. These identities, in turn, can be included 
as an ideational variable in causal analysis and used to explain events and actions. 
The focal point for constructivist analyses of identity and international policy was 
initially the nation-state (Katzenstein 1996; Berger 1996; Weldes 1996; Larsen 1999; 
Wæver 1998; Campbell 1998). But what, from a constructivist perspective, is a 
nation? According to Anderson’s (1991) now classical argument the nation is an 
“imagined community”. In a complex historical analysis Anderson shows how a 
common linguistic space, the nation, was created through the development of new 
forms of mass-communication and state administrative practices and came to be 
experienced by its members as a community. Despite the impossibility of ever 
meeting more than a fraction of one’s compatriots, citizens feel a sense of 
commonality. We thus, Anderson emphasises, distinguish members from non-
members and are often willing to make heavy sacrifices for a community that is seen 
as a sovereign political entity. Another way of putting this is that national belonging 
is part of our identity and shapes in crucial ways how we act and interact. 
As Neumann (1994: 58) points out, however, not only nations but also regions can be 
seen as imagined communities. This suggests that we can push this line of argument 
beyond the nation state (cf. Held 1998: 19; Bellamy 2004: 31f) and apply it to policy 
cooperation at a regional level. In all likelihood, regions are imagined as less thick 
(Walzer 1994) communities than the nation. Still, they could exhibit similar features. 
To illustrate, let us take the case of the Nordic regional cluster. 
The Nordic region is characterized by strong linguistic similarities (Wæver 1992b: 
95). The Swedish, Danish and Norwegian languages are very alike, and there is a 
widespread assumption in the populations that it is easy to understand each other. 
Finnish and Icelandic differ markedly but Swedish and Danish respectively are 
common second languages in these two countries. Moreover, universalistic welfare 
states developed in all of the countries in the same period with similar administrative 
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practices and technologies (Miles 2010: 186). Analyses of general societal discourses 
show that the Nordic countries do indeed share a perception of each other as coming 
from stable, small, rule-of-law welfare states (Hansen & Wæver 2001). That is, they 
recognize in each other a certain commonality as a basis for trust. In this way the 
Nordic region resembles Anderson’s national imagined community, although it is 
thinner and does not entail as strong ideas about sovereignty or patriotism. 
The Nordic case suggests that the patterns of visa cooperation can be explained as a 
result of ‘regional imagined communities’. Shared perceptions of likeness in terms of 
especially language and state structures generate trust which facilitates collaboration 
on sensitive issues. Within the regions the member states can meaningfully share and 
transfer sovereignty over decisions concerning which persons should be allowed or 
denied entry to their territory. But can this account be generalized beyond 
Scandinavia or do we need another approach to understand the remaining patterns? 
Let us look at the other groupings in the network one by one. The Benelux cluster – 
which is strong and persistent – is characterized by linguistic diversity 
(Vanhoonacker 2003: 14). The Netherlands and Belgium, however, share a colonial 
past and all three countries have a long history of state-building in the light of 
vulnerability to European warfare. The Southern group also has important 
similarities but many differences as well (Featherstone & Kazamias 2001: 3f; 
Heywood & McLaren 2010: 170f). There are strong commonalities between the 
Spanish, Portuguese and Italian languages. But the linguistic differences to Greece 
and Austria are considerable. The state-building trajectories of Spain and Portugal 
are again quite similar with an early colonial expansion, a strong Catholic church and 
a recent history of fascism. Greece, Italy and Slovenia exhibits some like features. But 
Malta and Austria are the odd ones out. The Eastern cluster displays substantial 
linguistic diversity, but also shares a recent history of Communism, peaceful 
revolution and EU-accession central to the state-building of these countries 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 2; Hamilton 1999: 136). All in all, the 
explanatory model has some purchase for the other clusters, but also limitations. It 
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seems very likely that some forms of regional imagined communities do exist which 
facilitates cooperation, but that these are less tightly knit than the Nordic group. 
What about France and Germany? Their consular facilities are made available to and 
used by almost all other EU-countries. The two states do not rely on the services of 
others. As centres of the network the region to which they belong is therefore Europe 
as such (cf. Wæver 2001: 39f). In the case of France this is understandable given its 
recent past as colonial world power which formed the making of the French nation-
state. In its own understanding France is still a global actor with a civilizing mission. 
Only now this role is played out through a European Union shaped in the image of 
and revolving around France (Wæver 1998). In Germany the nation-state was 
fundamentally reconfigured after the Second World War. Its administration was 
rebuilt and discourses of German identity underwent significant changes. Only as a 
peaceful part of Europe could Germany redeem itself after the atrocities of the gas 
chambers. Offering assistance to smaller EU members can be seen as way of enacting 
this role of an institutionally embedded friendly regional power (Katzenstein 1997; 
Wæver 1998). The European Union from its earliest days has been created around an 
idea of a French-German centre (Cole 2010). Bureaucratic structures both within the 
EU and in individual member states are to large extent influenced by the traditions 
of these two core countries. French and German are leading administrative and 
diplomatic languages in the EU spoken widely in most member states, especially by 
officials. Taken together, this explains why so many smaller member-states avail 
themselves of the consulates of France and Germany.  
The ‘regional imagined communities’ concept thus offers a very convincing 
explanation of Nordic cooperation and the role of EU core countries. It finds support 
in the remaining patterns as well. The latter, however, suggest that the account 
demands more commonality in language and nation-state history than can be 
observed.  
Constructivist arguments are not solely about identity. A different strand focuses on 
norms (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). This prompts us to ask if the network structure 
could be the result not of imagined communities but of a looser set of institutionally 
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embedded practices. It might be that for some reason the member states got in the 
habit of cooperating mainly with their neighbours and that this has gradually 
evolved into standard operating procedures and norms of appropriateness (March & 
Olsen 1989; Allison & Zelikow 1999). But this raises the question of what triggered 
the pattern of cooperation in the first place. The answer could be a common policy 
preference. As we saw in the previous sections shared interests can account for 
important parts of the findings. But in that case policy interests would seem to do the 
analytical work leaving little role for standard operating procedures. Only if norms 
and preferences begin to diverge and we see continued cooperation would the 
norms-based constructivism have purchase. The data period, however, makes it 
difficult to trace such potential shifts.  
Another trigger could be regional imagined communities. If state officials share a 
sense of belonging with their counterparts in neighbour countries this could spur 
cooperation which would then gradually become a standard of good practice. At 
first, this would again seem to make the norms-argument redundant as the common 
identity now drives the explanation. But in the cases where the imagined community 
looks rather too thin to account for all cooperation, as in the case of Southern Europe 
for example, the norms argument could carry important weight. Some 
commonalities in language and history prompt initial cooperation which then 
becomes institutionalized. In this way the two different constructivist accounts 
supplement each other. 
Regional patterns of cooperation have also been identified as a component of the 
legislative decision-making process of the European Union, and identity-driven 
factors have been put forward as important in explaining these (Naurin 2008; 
Kaeding & Selck 2005; Mattila & Lane 2001; Elgström et al. 2001). This could, on the 
one hand, suggest that visa collaboration is an ‘isomorphism’ (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983) from more well-established practices. If member-states cooperate regionally in 
one area this could inspire the same behaviour in other fields. With some 
administrative practices established broadening the cooperation would be 
comparatively easy. On the other hand, the presence of regional cooperation across a 
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diverse range of issues and arenas suggests that some form of imagined community 
is at play. Again, if countries see their neighbours as more like themselves than other 
member-states and hence more trustworthy this would account for why these norms 
of appropriateness arise in the first place. 
In sum, the concept of regional imagined communities provides a good account of 
the structures in the network. Especially if combined with a norms-based 
constructivism it provides the most extensive explanation of the patterns. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have investigated the structure and extent of the consular cooperation 
in visa matters amongst the Schengen-members in the period from 2005 to 2010. The 
aim was to further our understanding of intensive transgovernmentalism – the main 
type of policy-making in the area of interior and foreign affairs. I did this by 
investigating what patterns of cooperation has been established between the member 
states in this selected sovereignty sensitive policy area. To carry out the analysis I 
utilized a new dataset of consular visa representation agreements, and a network 
analytical approach to investigate the patterns in the data.  
I showed, firstly, that the member states strongly rely on cooperative arrangements. 
To a large extent they use each other’s consular services abroad in the visa-issuing 
process. The average Schengen member is independently represented in 
approximately 50 countries, via a cooperative agreement in 50 and not represented at 
all in 70.  
The network analysis showed, secondly, that cooperation throughout the period was 
structured in distinct clusters: a Nordic, Benelux, Southern-European and an 
emergent Central-Eastern. France and Germany were at the centre of the network. 
There were few ties across the clusters. Northern and Southern Europe, in particular, 
did hardly cooperate at all. 
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Drawing on three main theories within European and international studies I 
discussed what could explain this pattern of cooperation. I focused on assessing the 
merits of realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist perspectives.  
Realism emphasises the difficulties of cooperation in inter-state affairs. This provided 
an explanation of the position of the larger member states. Realist theory could also 
account for why smaller border-states are independently represented in 
neighbouring third countries. But the overall regional patterns remained puzzling.  
The liberal intergovernmentalist account focused on the national formation of 
preferences about migration control, and predicted that the member states would 
cooperate with others sharing a similar liberal or restrictive approach. This argument 
found particular support in relation to the Southern cluster where the importance of 
tourism constitutes a likely significant common interest. The liberal account also 
found some support in the rest of the patterns, but faced important counter-trends. 
The constructivist argument explained cooperation as rendered feasible by the 
existence of shared identities owing to regional commonalities in language and state-
building histories. These constructions make it possible for the member states to trust 
and cooperate with each other. I proposed the term ‘regional imagined communities’ 
to capture and explain the geographical clusters of cooperation. This concept was 
particular well-suited to account for Nordic collaboration and the central role of 
Germany and France. It could also go some way in explaining the remaining 
relations. But here the commonalities were weaker. This suggested the need for a 
supplementary norms-based constructivism working in conjunction with thin 
imagined communities.  
The case of visa policy was selected as an example of EU-cooperation spanning 
interior and foreign policy. As an area where the member states have established 
particularly widespread cooperation it is an ‘extreme case’. It enables us to identify 
patterns and dynamics which are likely to be at play in other sovereignty sensitive 
areas, albeit in more inchoate and therefore less easily observable form. The case of 
visa cooperation suggests that ideational factors such as regional imagined 
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communities are important in facilitating cooperation, but that common interests are 
of some relevance as well. Further studies of, for example, judicial and diplomatic 
collaboration could throw additional light on the relative explanatory potential of 
preferences and identities in explaining patterns of interaction between the member 
states. This could also help to establish the extent to which regional groupings 
characterize the intensive transgovernmentalism of foreign policy and justice and 
home and affairs cooperation. 
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Annex: Socio-metrical overviews 
AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT LU DK FI NO SE EL IS
AT 5 25 14 32 1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 14 5 23 1 29 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 16 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 2 14 40 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 1 8 2 18 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
NL 0 8 14 5 23 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT 1 0 19 26 44 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 76 14 5 23 1 32 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 5 0 10 0 4 0 0 4 10 12 0 0
FI 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 2 6 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 13 2 9 1 0 8 4 4 0 0
SE 2 1 7 4 13 5 7 1 0 4 4 5 0 0
EL 2 2 10 17 38 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
IS 0 0 3 0 17 1 4 0 0 51 6 16 10 0
Sociometric 1. Consular visa representation agreements in 2005
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2004). Data from 
2004.10.11.
NOTES: Reading the table from the rows it can be identified which partners a member state relies on. 
Germany, for example, (DE) used France's (FR) consular services in 16 locations abroad. Similarly, 
Sweden relied on Netherlands in 7 cities. Starting from the columns it can be found which partners relies 
on a member states. The column with Sweden (SE) shows, e.g., that IT, DK, FI, NO and IS use Swedish 
consular services in varying degrees. Please note that member states not participating in any agreements at 
all are not shown.  
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AT BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT LU DK NO SE EL IS
AT 5 27 14 1 32 1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 5 0 24 1 28 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 17 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 2 15 0 40 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 9 4 0 2 13 2 0 5 2 6 0 0
FR 0 0 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 1 9 2 0 18 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
NL 0 10 15 5 0 23 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
PT 1 0 19 26 0 50 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 81 16 5 0 24 1 31 1 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 6 0 4 10 0 5 0 0 10 12 0 0
NO 0 1 11 0 4 14 2 9 1 0 8 4 0 0
SE 2 1 7 4 5 13 5 7 1 0 4 5 0 0
EL 2 3 12 17 0 39 8 2 7 0 0 0 1 0
IS 0 0 4 0 6 17 1 4 0 0 57 17 11 0
Sociometric 2. Consular visa representation agreements in 2006
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2005). Data from 
2005.11.07.
NOTES: See sociometric 1.  
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AT BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT LU DK NO SE EL IS
AT 6 27 14 1 30 1 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 5 0 25 1 28 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 17 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 13 0 42 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 11 4 0 2 13 2 0 5 4 10 0 0
FR 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
NL 0 10 16 5 0 23 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
PT 1 0 17 26 0 51 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 81 17 5 0 24 1 30 1 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 6 0 4 11 0 5 0 0 10 13 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 3 11 2 8 1 0 9 8 0 0
SE 1 1 9 4 4 12 5 7 1 0 4 6 1 0
EL 1 2 11 17 0 39 8 2 7 0 0 0 1 0
IS 0 0 4 0 5 17 1 4 0 0 55 18 12 0
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2006). Data from 
2006.10.16.
Sociometric 3. Consular visa representation agreements in 2007
NOTES: See sociometric 1.  
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AT BE DE ES FI FR HU IT NL PT SI LU DK NO SE EL IS LV MT
AT 5 28 14 1 28 1 1 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 6 0 25 0 1 27 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 18 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 11 0 41 0 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 11 4 0 0 2 13 2 0 0 6 4 10 0 0 0 0
FR 0 1 5 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HU 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
NL 0 9 15 5 0 23 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
PT 1 1 17 27 0 44 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 17 3 11 0 0 0 6 11 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 69 15 5 0 24 0 1 31 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 13 0 4 11 0 0 5 0 0 0 10 15 0 0 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 4 11 0 2 8 1 0 0 10 8 0 0 0 0
SE 1 1 8 4 5 12 0 6 7 1 0 0 5 5 1 0 0 0
EL 1 2 11 17 0 38 0 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
IS 0 0 4 0 5 17 0 1 4 0 0 0 48 18 11 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sociometric 4. Consular visa representation agreements in 2008
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2007). Data from 
2007.12.17. 
NOTES: See sociometric 1.  
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AT BE DE ES FI FR HU IT NL PT SI LU DK NO SE EE LV EL LT IS MT PL
AT 5 28 14 1 28 1 1 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 16 6 0 25 0 1 27 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 18 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 10 0 35 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 2 1 13 4 0 0 2 13 2 0 0 5 4 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 2 5 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HU 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 9 15 5 0 23 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT 1 2 17 27 0 43 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 17 3 11 0 0 8 6 12 12 11 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 4
LU 1 69 14 5 0 24 0 1 31 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 2 0 14 0 3 10 1 0 5 0 1 0 19 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 4 11 0 2 8 1 0 0 13 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SE 1 1 9 4 4 10 1 5 7 1 0 0 11 14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
EE 0 0 15 0 11 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
LV 0 0 14 0 0 1 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL 1 2 10 17 0 37 0 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IS 0 0 4 0 5 16 0 1 4 0 0 0 39 22 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 27 0 0 10 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sociometric 5. Consular visa representation agreements in 2009
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2008). Data from 
2008.12.01. 
NOTES: See sociometric 1.  
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AT BE DE ES FI FR HU IT NL PT SI SZ LU DK LT NO SE EE LV EL IS MT PL
AT 5 27 14 1 28 2 1 3 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 15 7 0 28 0 1 22 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DE 0 1 1 0 18 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ES 0 1 10 0 30 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 1 1 13 4 0 2 2 13 2 0 0 0 4 0 4 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 2 5 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
HU 4 2 12 0 3 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
IT 0 2 9 2 0 19 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 9 14 5 1 24 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
PT 0 2 16 26 0 42 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 17 3 12 10 0 13 8 11 11 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 4
SZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 1 69 14 5 0 25 1 1 31 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 1 0 14 0 3 12 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 20 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT 4 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NO 0 1 10 0 4 11 1 2 8 1 0 0 0 13 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
SE 0 1 9 4 4 10 1 5 6 1 0 0 0 11 0 17 0 1 0 0 0 0
EE 2 0 15 14 11 0 7 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
LV 0 0 16 0 0 1 14 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL 1 2 10 17 0 34 1 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
IS 0 0 4 0 4 16 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 40 0 22 16 0 0 0 0 0
MT 26 0 0 10 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sociometric 6. Consular visa representation agreements in 2010
SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2010b). Data from 
2010.04.30.
NOTES: See sociometric 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Recent LEQS papers 
Monastiriotis, Vassilis. 'Regional Growth Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe.' LEQS Paper No. 
33, April 2011 
Johnston, Alison. 'The Revenge of Baumol's Cost Disease?: Monetary Union and the Rise of Public 
Sector Wage Inflation.' LEQS Paper No. 32, March 2011 
Glendinning, Simon. ‘’Europe, for example.’ LEQS Paper No. 31, March 2011 
Winkler, Heinrich August. ‘Greatness and Limits of the West. The History of an Unfinished Project.’ 
LEQS Paper No. 30, February 2011 
Dani, Marco. 'Assembling the fractured European consumer.' LEQS Paper No. 29, January 2011 
Joerges, Christian. 'Unity in Diversity as Europe's Vocation and Conflict's Law as Europe's 
Constitutional Form.' LEQS Paper No. 28, December 2010 
Kylstad, Ingrid. 'Turkey and the EU: A 'new' European identity in the making?' LEQS Paper No. 27, 
November 2010 
Costa-i-Font, Joan. 'Regional Single Currency Effects on Bilateral Trade with the European Union.' 
LEQS Paper No. 26, October 2010  
Erkan, Ozgur. ‘Spain’s Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: A Quantitative Analysis 
Within the Conceptual Framework of First and Second Order Elections.’ LEQS Paper No. 25, June 
2010 
White, Jonathan. ‘Left, Right and Beyond: The Pragmatics of Political Mapping.’ LEQS Paper No. 24, 
June 2010 
Monastiriotis, Vassilis & Zartaloudis, Sotirios. 'Beyond the crisis: EMU and labour market 
reform pressures in good and bad times.' LEQS Paper No. 23, June 2010 
Lütz, Susanne & Kranke, Matthias. ‘The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF 
Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries.’ LEQS Paper No. 22, May 2010 
Hartlapp, Miriam; Metz, Julia & Rauh, Christian. 'The agenda set by the EU Commission: the result of 
balanced or biased aggregation of positions?' LEQS Paper No. 21, April 2010 
Costa-i-Font, Joan. 'Unveiling Vertical State Downscaling: Identity and/or the Economy?' LEQS Paper 
No. 20, March 2010 
Delanty, Gerard. 'The European Heritage from a Critical Cosmopolitan Perspective. LEQS Paper No. 19, 
February 2010 
Outhwaite, William. 'Europe at 21: Transitions and Transformations since 1989'. LEQS Paper No. 18, 
January 2010 
Lavdas, Kostas A..'Normative Evolution in Europe: Small States and Republican Peace'. LEQS Paper 
No. 17, January 2010 
Schelkle, Waltraud. ‘Good governance in crisis or a good crisis for governance? A comparison of the EU 
and the US’. LEQS Paper No. 16, December 2009
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European visa cooperation 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEQS 
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE London 
Email: euroinst.LEQS@lse.ac.uk  
 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/Home.aspx   
